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I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues that private individuals may sue government agen-
cies and employees for failing to enforce child support statutes. Failure to
enforce child support orders is a systemic problem which directly affects
countless children, including foster care children, who depend upon the
money promised in child support enforcement orders for their existence. The
ramifications of this failure to pay spread beyond the boundaries of the
* For their helpful suggestions, I would like to thank Bill Fraser (West Palm Beach)
and Carolyn Salisbury (University of Miami Youth Law Clinic), children's advocates. I
would also like to thank Kathryn Gainey, law student at Harvard Law for her research and
other assistance.
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individual family unit, however, as custodial parents and children are forced
to depend upon public assistance as a substitute rather than as what could
potentially be a substitute.
This article does not purport to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the
national child support enforcement policy. Rather, it focuses specifically
upon the Florida support enforcement system, juxtaposed with examples
elicited from other support enforcement schemes. Through a survey of
primary sources, including federal and state statutes, Florida case law, and
selected case law from other jurisdictions, this article intends to argue that
state enforcement agencies and private agencies may be held responsible for
their mismanagement of child support enforcement. It applies the primary
source material two similar cases: children in the foster care system and
children who reside with a custodial parent. It also analyzes private causes
of action against government agencies and government employees, and
argues that individuals should have a private cause of action for failing to
collect child support enforcement.
Part II describes the extent of the support enforcement problem in
Florida, which suggests that this problem is endemic to our society as a
whole. Part II also describes the complex federal and state statutory scheme
governing child support in an effort to highlight the separation of powers
between federal and state government. This statutory analysis reveals addi-
tional reasons why private citizen suits are necessary, including lack of legal
representation of the child's interests in current support enforcement suits.
Part IlI examines federal law as a potential source of liability, and
argues that the application of section 1983 of title 42 of the United States
Code ("section 1983"), which provides individuals with the ability to file
private citizen lawsuits for violation of either constitutional or statutory
rights, has resulted in varying outcomes.' Part I examines the predominant
standards announced in decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit that are used to determine whether section 1983 is satisfied.
The common law does not clearly establish whether one of the tests prevails,
but instead illustrates the usage of several tests. This analysis of case prece-
1. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The statute provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, ex-
cept that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
[Vol. 25:693
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dent is designed to elicit factors that the courts commonly consider in decid-
ing liability under section 1983 so as to apply these factors to the case of
children and child support payments.
Part IV argues that government agencies may be held liable under
section 1983 through violations of the Social Security Act, despite the wel-
fare reforms which took place in 1996. Children may not recover through
section 1983 for violations of substantive due process because the courts
have not been willing to grant a property right to children in promised, but
uncollected, child support payments. Despite welfare reforms which elimi-
nated entitlement programs, a viable due process argument remains for foster
care children. The right of non-foster children to recover under section 1983
was limited by the welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"), because such chil-
dren can no longer claim that a due process violation arises from property
rights to an entitlement when the State of Florida has explicitly established a
welfare system that is not an entitlement. After the welfare reforms, section
1983 can be invoked for violations of due process only in those states where
the welfare benefit remains an entitlement.
Part IV examines federal statutory liability by considering the provi-
sions of the Social Security Act.2 In order to receive block grants from the
federal government, state governments must "substantially comply" with the
statutory provisions regulating collection of child support payments.3 How-
ever, the criterion of standard compliance is only seventy-five percent, but
serves as an incentive and condones state action which fails to collect and
distribute a fourth of the child support orders.4 In Blessing v. Freestone the
Supreme Court held that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act did not bestow
a private cause of action upon custodial mothers under section 1983 for a
state's failure to operate its system in substantial compliance, but it left open
the possibility that "some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual
2. Social Security Act, Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The
statute provides as follows:
For the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by non-custodial
parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such
children are living, locating noncustodial parents, establishing paternity, ob-
taining child and spousal support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining
support will be available... to all children (whether or not eligible for assis-
tance under... [AFDC]) for whom such assistance is requested, there is
hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sym sufficient to
carry out the purposes of this part.
Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4. 45 C.F.R § 305.20 (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 609(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
5. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
2001]
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rights."6 For example, Blessing does not preempt the possibility of a private
recovery in instances of failures to distribute pass-through payments and
failures to comply with gap-filling provisions.7 If a state fails to distribute
the predetermined portions of child support payments after collection, then it
8violates the rights of children who live with their custodial parents. Such a
private right of action is necessary so children may seek enforcement of the
child support orders to which they are entitled. Part IV argues that the courts
would sustain a private action beyond summary judgment if that action is
brought for child support that the state is obligated to distribute to children
upon collection.
Part V examines sovereign immunity and the State of Florida to deter-
mine what factors are necessary for the state to be held liable.
Part VI applies the concept of sovereign immunity, and argues that the
State of Florida is liable under sovereign immunity for violation of statutory
provisions in collecting and distributing child support amounts on behalf of
children.
II. UNREPRESENTED INTERESTS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Child welfare, family responsibility, and decreased welfare rolls-each is
an asserted policy interest of the state in establishing and enforcing child
support orders. 9 In creating child support policies, states must balance the
interests of family autonomy and fiscal economy with concern for the child's
standard of living; as a result, "fiscal interest" or "self-supporting families"
dominate child support policy.10 An issue emerges from this interest balanc-
ing as to how to construct the optimal procedure for child support enforce-
ment that would protect the rights of the children without unduly burdening
the fiscal resources of the state. This article asserts that private citizen suits
against the public and private agencies are one additional means which
empower custodial parents and children to protect their own interests while
encouraging states to abide by the statutory provisions to which the legisla-
tures have agreed. The purpose of Part I is to assess the current federal and
Florida state procedures in child support enforcement in an effort to frame
the importance of private citizen suits.
6. Id. at 345.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 345-46.
9. JYL J. JOSEPHSON, GENDER, FAMILIES, AND STATE CHILD SUPPORT PoLIcY IN THE
UNrTED STATES 148 (1997).
f 10. Id. at 149.
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A. Federal Statutes as a Skeleton for Child Support Enforcement Programs
Federal statutes provide the skeletal framework within which states
formulate child support enforcement programs. Federal child support en-
forcement began with the-enactment of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act,
the Child Support Enforcement Amendments ("CSEA") of 1984, and the
Family Support Act ("FSA") of 1988.11 The Social Security Act requires
each state to establish a Title IV-D child support enforcement agency, which
serves both recipients and nonrecipients of welfare benefits.1 2 Furthermore,
the Office of Child Support Enforcement ("OCSE") is responsible for "moni-
toring and assisting" the Title IV-D state agencies. 13 The CSEA mandated
that each state establish formulas for calculating child support orders, but the
courts were not bound to invoke them and the amount calculated from the
formulas was not treated as "presumptively correct."' 14 However, the FSA,
enacted four years later, established a rebuttable presumption that the amount
calculated by the formulas is correct unless it is demonstrated to be "unjust or
inappropriate in a particular case" through a written record. 5 The cumula-
tive effect of these three federal statutes was to structure states' child support
enforcement activities and to render legitimacy to the calculation of child
support awards.
Additional provisions offered further definition to states in formulating
child support enforcement programs, including provisions that ensured state
accountability. The PRWORA included a state mandate that each state
11. NANCY S. ERICKSON, CHILD SUPPORT MANUAL FOR ATrORNEYS AND ADvOcATEs 6
(1992). Title IV-D was enacted in 1974. Id.
12. Id. at7.
13. Id.
14. Id. at9.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1994). The statute provides as follows:
(1) The guidelines established pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made avail-
able to all judges and other officials who have the power to determine child
support awards within such State.
(2) There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or administrative
proceeding for the award of child support, that the amount of the award which
would result from the application of such guidelines is the correct amount of
child support to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the re-
cord that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in
a particular case, as determined under criteria established by the State, shall
be sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case.
Id. Florida has adopted an "income sharing" model in which the income of both
custodial and noncustodial parents is augmented to calculate the child support
contribution. ERIcKsON, supra note 11, at 192-93. The guidelines are set forth in
section 61.30 of the Florida Statutes.
2001]
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conduct an annual report pertaining to its child support enforcement program
and submit a copy to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services. 16 This represented a shift in policy to "focus on data reliability and
to assess performance outcomes instead of determining compliance with
process steps., 17 While the federal government subscribes to results-oriented
child support legislation, state governments retain authority to execute the
federal requirements through individual child support programs.'8 Federal
statutes provide the boundaries within which, and the limits according to
which, state governments must formulate and enact child support enforce-
ment programs.
Federal legislation also includes an indomitable incentive for states in
the formulation of child support enforcement provisions. The federal statutes
include a system of penalties to be imposed upon state governments for their
failure to establish child support enforcement programs. 19 For example,
under Title IV-D, states forfeit block grants for Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families ("TANF') if they fail to achieve certain paternity percent-
ages, if they submit "incomplete or unreliable" statistical information, or if
they fail to "substantially comply," unless the violation is corrected within
the following year and the statistical information submitted for the following
year is not "incomplete or unreliable."20 The fiscal penalties imposed upon
16. State Self-Assessment Review and Report, 65 Fed. Reg. 7772-01 (Dec. 12, 2000)
[hereinafter State Self-Assessment Review and Report] (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Pt. 308).
17. Id. at 7774.
18. Id. The federal government's suggested role was described as assisting the states
in conducting and evaluating their self-assessment reviews, supervising the enactment of state
self-assessment, referring states to the optimal procedures of the other states, and considering
the potential success of possible self-assessment actions. See id. at "Federal Role."
19. See id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8) (1994 & Supp. 1998). The statute provides as follows:
(i)(I) [If] the State program failed to achieve the paternity establishment per-
centages... or to meet other performance measures that may be established
by the Secretary;
(II) on the basis of the results of an audit or audits conducted.., that the
State data submitted... is incomplete or unreliable; or
(III) on the basis of the results of an audit or audits conducted.. . that a State
failed to substantially comply with 1 or more of the requirements of part D;
and
(ii) that, with respect to the succeeding fiscal year-
(I) the State failed to take sufficient corrective action to achieve the appropri-
ate performance levels or compliance as described in subparagraph (A)(i); or
(II) the data submitted by the state pursuant.., is incomplete or unreliable;
the amounts otherwise payable to the State. . . shall be reduced by the per-
centage specified in subparagraph (B).
Id. (emphasis added).
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the states vary from one to five percent according to the number of consecu-
tive years in which the state procedure fails to conform with federal child
support enforcement regulations.21  The federal statute wields a sword
against states as a compelling incentive for the enactment of child support
enforcement provisions that satisfy federal requirements. Indeed, a Florida
statute specifically acknowledged that noncompliance with PRWORA could
lead to severe economic tragedy, which "poses a direct and immediate threat
to the health, safety, and welfare of the children and citizens of the state and
constitutes an emergency." 22
Given the potential for federal penalties, the states have little alternative
but to satisfy the federal statutes to the letter when creating child support
enforcement schemes. In fact, some agencies have recognized the current
statutory scheme as overly burdensome. For example, the National Child
Support Enforcement Association passed a resolution that urged Congress to
"simplify the distribution of child support to provide additional support to
families attempting to reach self-sufficiency and to provide relief for states
and families from the burdensome complexity of the PRWORA distribution
rules" given the welfare reforms in the 1990s.'
Each state formulates its own child support enforcement program
through which intrastate child support orders can be enforced by a variety of
means, including garnishing wages, seizing tax refunds, or placing the obli-
gor in jail.24 However, approximately one third of child support enforcement
cases are interstate cases, in which the non-custodial parent resides in a
different state than the custodial parent and child.2 Jyl Josephson describes
interstate child support cases as more complex: while he suggests that the
child support enforcement system be uniform across the country adminis-
21. § 609 (a)(8)(B). The statute provides as follows:
The reductions required under subparagraph (A) shall be-
(i) not less than 1 nor more than 2 percent;
(ii) not less than 2 nor more than 3 percent, if the finding is the 2nd consecu-
tive finding made pursuant to subparagraph (A); or
(iii) not less than 3 nor more than 5 percent, if the finding is the 3rd or a sub-
sequent consecutive such finding.
Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 61.1826(1)(e) (2000); see also § 61.1826(1)(d) (providing that
"[n]oncomplance with federal law could result in a substantial loss of federal funds for the
state's child support enforcement program and the temporary assistance for needy families
welfare block grant").
23. Nat'l Child Support Enforcement Ass'n, Resolution on Child Support Distribution
Reform, available at http:lwww.ncsea.orglresolutionslres-dist.PDF (last visited Feb. 10,
2001).
24. JOSEPHSON, supra note 9, at 148.
25. Id.
2001]
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tered by a federal agency, such as the Internal Revenue Service, rather than
each state conducting its own support enforcement program, he recognizes
that this change is most likely not feasible. 6 The Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act ("URESA") was designed to enforce interstate
child support obligations.27 However, the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act ("UIFSA") was enacted in 1998 to replace URESA. 28 Unlike URESA,
which lacked uniformity among the states, UIFSA was designed to provide
"uniform rules, procedures, and forms for interstate cases." 29 Congress also
passed the Child Support Recovery Act in 1992 in an effort to address the
enforcement problems that arise in interstate cases.30 Policy efforts regarding
interstate child support cases are designed to increase collection percentages
by integrating state procedures. However, interstate child support enforce-
ment continues to challenge the statutory scheme.
B. Florida's Legislative Response
In response to federal legislation, the State of Florida granted the au-
thority to adopt and administer child support enforcement provisions to the
Department of Revenue ("DOR"), and custodial parents who have a child
support order that is more than thirty days past due may solicit the DOR to
collect the overdue support payment.31  Under Florida law, child support
26. Id. at 153. Josephson describes "administrative upheaval" as the reason why child
support enforcement could not be conducted on a federal rather than a state level; this would
most likely include systemic costs in combining the various provisions from each of the fifty
states into a uniform federal standard. See id.
27. ERICKsON, supra note 11, at 306.
28. 64 Fed. Reg. 8382, 8383 (1999).
29. ERICKsON, supra note 11, at 306.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The Act establishes penalties for an
individual who:
(1) willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who re-
sides in another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period
longer than 1 year, or is greater than $ 5,000;
(2) travels in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to evade a sup-
port obligation, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer
than 1 year, or is greater than $ 5,000; or
(3) willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who re-
sides in another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period
longer than 2 years, or is greater than $ 10,000.
Id.
31. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2000). The statute provides that "[tihe Department of
Revenue shall have the authority to adopt rules to implement the child support enforcement
provisions of this section." § 61.13(1)(b)(4); see also State of Florida Department of Revenue,
[Vol. 25:693
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orders made after January 1, 1985, or made before January 1, 1985, but
subsequently modified shall "direct that the payments of child support be
made... through the depository in the county where the court is located. 32
The depository is the default method according to which child support
awards are paid. Parties may avoid the depository per the statute, but only
upon their mutual agreement and only if it is in the "best interest of the
child., 33 The Public Information Office of the Florida Office of Child Sup-
port Enforcement indicated that the information with respect to whether the
majority of orders uses the depository's exact members was not readily
available. 4 Florida statutes also direct "each depository to perform duties
with respect to the operation and maintenance of a State Disbursement Unit
and the non-Title IV-D component of the State Case Registry., 35 The state
defines the relationship between the DOR and the depository as a cooperative
agreement that permits access to the State Disbursement Unit and non-Title
IV-D provisions of the State Case Registry, which "complies with all state
and federal requirements. ' 36 In Title IV-D cases, the rights of the obligee
regarding the depository are conveyed to the government agency.37
The clerks of court are charged with collecting, enforcing, and distribut-
ing child support payments. 38 In furtherance of this duty, the clerks created a
statewide system that permits automated processing of child support pay-
ments.39  Specifically, the Florida legislature noted that only a contract
between the DOR and the Florida Association of Court Clerks would ensure
state compliance sufficient to avoid a federal financial penalty.
40
The actual application of Florida procedure to the child support en-
forcement system may be sufficient to avoid federal penalties, but it is not
adequate for collecting child support. In fact, one DOR Quarterly Report
indicates that $45 million more in child support was collected than distrib-
Child Support Services, at http:llsun6.dms.state.fl.usldor/childsupportlenforcement.html (last
visited March 31, 2001).
32. § 61.13(1)(d)1.
33. § 61.13(1)(d)3.
34. April 2, 2001 telephone conversation with OCSE Public Information Officer Dave
Bums.
35. § 61.1826(1).
36. § 61.1826(2). The depositories also must enter into a "written agreement" with
the Florida Association of Court Clerks and the Department of Revenue. Id.
37. § 61.13(1)(d)5.
38. See § 61.1826(1)(a).
39. § 61.1826(1)(g) (recognizing the establishment of the Clerk of Court Child
Support Enforcement Collection System).
40. See § 61.1826(1), (3), (4) (recognizing the importance of the clerk's involvement
and directing the Department of Revenue [hereinafter DOR] to contract with the Florida
Association of Court Clerks).
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uted to the children for the quarter covered, even though Florida law speci-
fies that collected support ought to remain in the depository for only two
days.4 In addition to child support money that is not collected, the child
support enforcement program in Florida exhibits a fundamental problem in
distributing the money collected, as evidenced by the DOR holding sizeable
amounts that should have been distributed. In the current system, the inter-
ests of the State of Florida are satisfied because the child support enforce-
ment program avoids federal penalty. However, the result is an ineffective,
inequitable, and unjust system. Children, whether they reside with their
custodial parents or in foster homes, do not receive the support to which they
are entitled. The system, although the result of complex statutory interaction
and interest balancing between family autonomy and state fiscal interest, fails
in its primary goal: to provide financial support to children. This systemic
failure in Florida warrants the extension of private citizen suits against public
and private entities to ensure that the child support orders are enforced and
distributed correctly.
In addition to the failure to distribute child support awards, another
systemic feature provides support for private citizen suits. Under the current
statutory scheme, the DOR specifies that an attorney-client relationship does
not exist between the attorneys which it hires to enforce child support orders
and the custodial parent; rather, the client is the DOR itself. 42 The DOR has
the authority to collect child support orders, and it may impose remedies
upon noncustodial parents, including seizing IRS tax refunds, freezing and
seizing bank accounts, income deduction, liens on real and personal property,
liens on workers' compensation and unemployment compensation, and by
suspending professional licenses and drivers licenses. Thus, the attorney
who is hired to seek child support enforcement is an advocate for the state
and not for the interests of the custodial parent. Nancy Erickson notes that
because the attorney is representing the interests of the state, the attorney will
not represent the interests of the custodial parent (or the child when they are
in conflict with or do not coincide with those of the state. Furthermore,
Erickson cites the following examples of the conflict between the interests of
the state and those of custodial parents: when a state seeks child support
from the noncustodial parent even if the custodial parent does not desire it, or
41. October 1999 report submitted by Florida Department of Revenue office of Child
Support Enforcement to federal OCSE in HHS.
42. State of Florida Department of Revenue, supra note 31.
43. Id. Other remedies include: suspending Florida driver, professional, and hunting
licenses; issuing interstate arrest warrants; reporting nonpayment of child support to credit
bureaus and garnishing wages; denying passport applications or causing passports to be
suspended (if the unpaid obligation is $5,000 or more). FLA. STAT. §§ 409.2551, .2598
(2000).
44. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 128.
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when a state supports custody for the father in an effort to eliminate the
mother and child from public assistance.45
If Erickson's assertion is correct, there is a systemic interest in permit-
ting custodial parents their own representation. This systemic feature pro-
vides a compelling argument that custodial parents must retain a corollary
right to sue to protect their individual interests. If a custodial parent is not
allowed to sue for support enforcement under Title IV-D, the result would be
the disenfranchisement of an entire segment of custodial parents and their
children. Congress would not intend, and the courts would not allow, this
result. Indeed, a custodial parent may sue a noncustodial parent even after
and even though their right to receive child support was assigned under Title
IV-D.4 Erickson reports that it is essential for a custodial parent to retain the
private right to sue the noncustodial parent because the interests of states do
not necessarily coincide with those of the custodial parent.47 The question
that this article pursues extends the justification stemming from lack of
representation of custodial parents against noncustodial parents to the issue
of whether one has a right to sue private and public agencies who are respon-
sible for child support enforcement. As privatization of public agency
enforcement increases through application of section 409.25575 of the
Florida Statutes, this remedy can be even more important to ensuring timely
distribution of child support collected to the child's custodian.48
Part II described the federal legislation in child support enforcement that
resulted in state enforcement programs by virtue of the threat of severe
penalties. The child support enforcement system in Florida is no exception.
Part II also explored the failure of the current Florida statutory scheme to
fully distribute money owed to children and to represent the interests of
children in enforcing support orders. A private cause of action against public
or private agencies in charge of collecting and distributing child support
funds is necessary to correct these systemic failures.
III. FEDERAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF LIABILITY
Federal law offers a possible source for private action against agencies
that fail to enforce child support orders or that fail to distribute child support
funds collected, which are necessary to the livelihood of foster children and
children who live with their custodial parents. If an individual is acting as an
agent of the state, then that individual may be sued for a violation of section
45. Id. at 127-28.
46. See id. at 129.
47. Id. If the custodial parent is able to collect the child support money, the potential
for attaining freedom from public assistance increases. Id.
48. § 409.25575.
2001]
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1983. 49 Section 1983 allows citizens to sue those who act "under the color of
any statute ... of any State" for a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 50 Section 1983 provides
two possible foundations on which a suit for noncompliance with a child
support order can be based: a private action must arise from a violation of
either constitutional or statutory rights. Part III will apply the provisions of
section 1983 to constitutional violations of procedural and substantive due
process in addition to statutory violations of Titles IV-D and TV-E of the
Social Security Act.
The common law is less than clear as to when individuals have a private
right of action under section 1983. If the statute providing the rights alleg-
edly being denied contains an express prohibition against the bringing of an
independent action pursuant to section 1983, or if the statute includes reme-
dial measures that were sufficient to demonstrate congressional intent to
exclude such a remedy, then no private right of action will likely be allowed
to go forward pursuant to section 1983. For example, the enforcement
mechanisms of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the administra-
tive mechanism from the Education of the Handicapped Act both demon-
strated that Congress intended to preempt the private action remedy estab-
lished in section 1983.52 Furthermore, if a state alleges that the statute either
expressly prohibits or provides sufficient mechanisms such that section 1983
becomes unnecessary, then the state has the burden of proof in establishing
that a private cause of action does not arise.
53
The United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit courts have
predominantly applied combinations of the criteria announced in Wright v.
49. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). An implied cause of action was no longer
necessary to private enforcement under section 1983, and the four-part inquiry was simplified
because section 1983 allows for recovery for a violation of rights under a federal statute. See
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 525-26 (1990). The court mentions one
common requirement that remained between both implied causes of action and section 1983:
the statutory language "must confer identifiable enforceable rights." Id. at 526. It is important
to remember that the Eleventh Amendment precludes actions for any relief directly against the
state itself, and also precludes damage actions against state government employees and agents
in their state representative capacity. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment does
not, however, preclude damage actions against state personnel in their individual capacity, nor
does the Eleventh Amendment preclude actions for declaratory or equitable relief against state
personnel in their representative capacities. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
51. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987).
52. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521 (describing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012
(1984)).
53. Wilder, 479 U.S. at 521.
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City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority54 and Wilder v. Vir-
ginia Hospital Association.55 The standards applied in Wright and Wilder,
although formulated differently, encompass similar criteria. In Wright, the
Court applied section 1983, holding that the regulations gave low income
tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the
regulations were fully authorized by the statute.56 The Court noted that the
Brooke Amendment evinced a mandatory right and a clear intent to benefit
the tenants. 57 In Wilder, the Court considered whether the legislature in-
tended to benefit the tenants in the utility and rental rates, and articulated the
prevailing test used to determine whether a private cause of action arises
under section 1983: 1) the statutory or constitutional provision must be
"intended to benefit the putative plaintiff;" 2) the obligation upon govern-
ment must be mandatory; and 3) the plaintiffs interest must not be "'too
vague and amorphous' such that it is 'beyond the competence of the judiciary
to enforce.' 58
Although the criteria enunciated in Wilder provides a useful test, Golden
State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles formulates the section 1983 test along
different lines. The Court in Golden State described the question of a private
cause of action under section 1983 in terms of two criteria: 1) violation of a
federal right; and 2) Congress "'specifically foreclosed a remedy under
[section] 1983."'" 9 In determining whether a violation of a federal right
occurred, Golden State cited Wright as precedent and considered issues such
as whether the provision created binding obligations upon the state, whether
the plaintiff's interest was too vaue to be enforceable, and whether the
provision benefited the plaintiff. However, in addition to the criteria
applied from Wright, the Court also considered whether Congress intended to
preempt a private action under section 1983. In response, Golden State cited
54. Id. at 418 (finding a private cause of action under section 1983 against the public
housing authority for violating the rent ceiling of the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act
and the regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
55. 496 U.S. at 498 (holding that the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act includes
a private cause of action for health care providers to seek reimbursement of costs from state
officials).
56. Wright, 479 U.S. at 420.
57. Id. at 430.
58. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.
59. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)
(quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1005 n.9). Golden State held that the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution does not create a right to private enforcement under section 1983 because it
"secures federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state
law." Id. at 107 (quoting from Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613
(1979)).
60. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106.
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precedent where the provision included ample enforcement procedures, and
where a suit by plaintiff "'would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully
tailored scheme., 6 Thus, the Golden State Court conducted an analysis
similar to that developed in both Wright and Wilder.
However, Suter v. Artist M.62 appeared to retreat from the standard
enunciated in Wilder in failing to apply Wilder to decide whether a private
cause of action exists under section 1983.63 It was not sufficient that the
provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act were manda-
tory; this fact alone did not give rise to section 1983 liability.64 The Supreme
Court in Suter found it significant that the provisions of the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act did not include a formula or percentage by
which to quantify "reasonable efforts," and the Court interpreted the legisla-
tive intent as intending to exclude recovery under section 1983 if rights
instilling such a cause of action were omitted from the statutory language. 65
The Court distinguished Suter from Wilder in that the statute in Wilder
specified that the "reasonable utilities" costs were limited and rent costs were
limited to thirty percent of the recipient's income; Wilder gave rise to a cause
of action under section 1983, while Suter did not.66 In holding that section
1983 did not supply a private cause of action, Suter conducted a "careful
examination of the language.., in the context of the entire act," which led to
the conclusion that the "'reasonable efforts' language does not unambigu-
,,67ously confer an enforceable right upon the Act's beneficiaries.
Unlike Wilder and Wright, the Court in. Suter adopted a standard of
intense statutory scrutiny to determine whether a right suitable for section
1983 enforcement arises. The dissent in Suter described the majority opin-
ion's holding not only as "plainly inconsistent" with Wilder, but also con-
spicuously lacking the application of the common law principles to deter-
mine section 1983 liability.6 8 However, the majority did not explicitly
61. Id. at 107 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012).
62. 503 U.S. 347,357 (1992).
63. Id. (holding that children beneficiaries of the Adoption Assistance in Child
Welfare Act did not have a section 1983 cause of action against the Illinois agency responsible
for exerting "reasonable efforts" to administer the placement of foster care children because
such language was too vague to be enforceable).
64. Id. at 358.
65. See id. at 360.
66. Id. at 361-62.
67. Suter, 503 U.S. at 363.
68. Id. at 365 (providing a thorough summary of principles for finding a private right
of action under Section 1983). The dissent stated: "I cannot acquiesce in this unexplained
disregard for established law." Id.
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overrule Wilder's three-part analysis, thus leaving it unclear which analysis
should or will be conducted.69
In the more recent Blessing decision, the Court indicated that the analy-
sis from Wright and Wilder remains good law as shown when the court
applied a three-part test to determine whether a private cause of action exists
under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.70 The Blessing Court reversed
the lower court's order recognizing a cause of action for failure of the Ari-
zona child support system to meet the federally mandated "substantial com-
pliance" requirement of the federal statute, commenting that neither the
plaintiffs nor the lower court had engaged in the proper analysis of the
specific rights infringed upon. The Court also found, however, that the child
support statutory scheme was not comprehensive enough to preclude section
1983 liability and found there was no express preclusion.71 The Court went
on to suggest amendment of the complaint to include a request for relief
connected to plead failure to distribute the support payments due, which it
implied would be action pursuant to section 1983.72
Other decisions reveal that the Eleventh Circuit and related district
courts also treat the test formulated in Wilder favorably. For example, in
Doe v. Chiles,73 the issue was whether the failure of the Florida Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services to furnish Medicaid within the rea-
sonably prompt time mandated by the Medicaid Act74 constituted a valid
basis for the lower court's providing of injunctive relief pursuant to section
1983.75 The circuit court distinguished Suter, analyzed Wilder and Wright,
and held that the plaintiffs had a federal right to reasonably prompt Medicaid71
assistance and found the right properly enforceable under section 1983. In
Mallo v. Public Health Trust of Dade County,77 the court used the two-part
test to determine whether a private right of action exists under section 1983,
69. See Ashish Prasad, Comment, Rights Without Remedies: Section 1983 Enforce-
ment of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 197, 206 (1993), for a
thorough discussion and comparison of standards enunciated in both the Wilder and Suter
decisions. It should also be noted that Congress amended the statute after the ruling in Suter,
with the statute-related notes and legislative history suggesting congressional desire to
effectively overrule Suter.
70. Blessing v. Firestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
71. Id. at 338-39.
72. Id. at 345-46.
73. 136 F.3d 709 (1lth Cir. 1998).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(8) (1994).
75. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 714. The complaint alleged the time being taken exceeded
four years. Id.
76. Id. at 709.
77. 88 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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and the Wilder framework is encompassed within this test.78 The burden of
the first step falls upon the defendants, who must demonstrate that Congress
either explicitly or implicitly intended to "foreclose such private enforce-
ment. '79 The court held that the defendants failed to meet the burden that
Congress intended to preclude recovery private action in conjunction with
the Medicaid Act.80 The burden of the second step falls upon the plaintiffs,
who must demonstrate that their federal rights were violated.8' As part of the
second step, the court incorporated the Wilder three-part test "to determine
whether statutory provisions implicitly create [a] federal right., 82 Thus, the
three-part test from Wilder remains in good standing in the Eleventh Circuit.
Part III analyzed the development of common law standards for deter-
mining whether a private cause of action arises under section 1983, arguing
that, although there is not one definitive standard, the prevailing law repre-
sents a combination and relationship of factors developed from cases such as
Wilder and Golden State. Part IV will apply the tests to argue that federal
law-violations of the constitutional guarantee to due process and violations of
the Social Security Act-gives rise to a private cause of action of both custo-
dial parents and foster children.
II. VIOLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL OR A STATUTORY RIGHT
A. Constitutional Right
Child support orders implicate issues raised by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The CSEA mandates that states establish "expedited proc-
esses" in instances of Title IV-D child support enforcement. 83 Accordingly,
states must protect the due process rights of the parties in such expedited
processes, and custodial parents are entitled to notice and to an opportunity to
be heard.84 However, this exception does not provide an avenue for liability
under section 1983 because the problem of failure to enforce does not trigger
the due process requirement of the expedited processes. Rather, this article
examines the issue of whether a state or a private agency acting under the
78. Id. at 1379.
79. Id. at 1380 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 423).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Mallo, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
83. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 355.
84. 45 C.F.R 303.101(c)(2) (2000). The regulation provides as follows: "[u]nder
expedited processes... the due process rights of the parties involved must be protected." Id.
Section 303.101(c)(1) of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations specifically governs the
issue of paternity determination. Id.
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color of state authority may be held liable for mishandling or failing to
collect child support.
When injunctive relief is sought, rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the Court to consider the following four factors: 1) the
substantial likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; 2) the substan-
tial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the temporary restrain-
ing order is not issued; 3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm a tempo-
rary restraining order may cause the defendants; and 4) the grant of a tempo-
rary restraining order will not disserve the public interest. As to the four
factors, "'no particular quantum of proof is required as to each of the four
criteria."' 8 6 The four factors, which also govern the grant of preliminary
injunctive relief, favor the issuance of a temporary restraining order in this
case. Likelihood of success on the merits is not to be equated with success
87on the merits.
As to children in foster care, the government cannot condition receipt of
a benefit, such as remaining in foster care, on the relinquishment of a consti-
tutional right.
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the gov-
ernment may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to "produce a result which [it] could not command di-
85. E.g., Levi-Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (1lth Cir.
1995).
86. Laboratorios Roldan v. Tex Int'l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1565 (S:D. Fla. 1995)
(quoting Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 925 (S.D. Fla. 1981)).
87. Paul Y. v. Singletary, 979 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing Univ. of
Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981)); Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1190 (N.D.
I1. 1990) (citing Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir.
1984)) (holding in an action against the Illinois' state child welfare agency for inadequate
caseworkers and other services the party requesting a preliminary injunction must show as a
threshold matter, that they have "some likelihood of succeeding on the merits" in the sense
that their "'chances are better than negligible"').
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rectly." [citation omitted] Such interference with constitutional
rights is impermissible.
8
"At a minimum, 'due process requires that government officials refrain
from acting in an irrational, arbitrary or capricious manner.'" 8 9 "The absence
of standards governing the withdrawal or modification of services permits
arbitrary decisionmaking" in violation of due process.90 This is equally true
if the government agency imposes standards that are different from those
established by written policies or regulations.91
It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncon-
trolled discretion in an agency of government vested with the ad-
ministration of a vast program, such as public housing, would be
an intolerable invitation to abuse. [citation omitted] For this rea-
son alone due process requires that selections among applicants be
made in accordance with "ascertainable standards," [citation omit-
ted] .... 92
Administering a government program "using unwritten standards leads to
rule by decree and not by law. '93
The property and liberty interests that are protected by procedural due
process are creatures of state law, including statutes, regulations, and deci-
sional law interpreting state common law or the federal constitution.94 The
touchstone for a property interest is that it creates "a legitimate claim of
entitlement" to a benefit.95 "[R]ules and understandings, promulgated and
fostered by state officials ... may justify [a] legitimate claim of entitlement"
to the benefit.
96
88. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990) (alteration in original)
(quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); see also, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv.,
Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150
(5th Cir. 1961) ("[t]he State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the
renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process").
89. Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F. Supp. 929, 940 (S.D. W. Va.
1996) (quoting Pollnow v. Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1985)).
90. Mayer v. Wing, 922 F. Supp. 902, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
91. Pressley Ridge, 947 F. Supp. at 940-41.
92. Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968).
93. U.S. Dep't of Justice, DEA v. Burke, 968 F. Supp. 672, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
94. E.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
95. Id. at 577.
96. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 602; see also Brown v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue,
881 F.2d 1018, 1027 (11th Cir. 1989) (fact that rules provide for a hearing to challenge
dismissal weighs in favor of finding a protected interest); Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529
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The recipient has a property interest in a benefit if the government
cannot terminate it except for good cause, and the existence of procedures to
challenge the termination is evidence of the state's recognition that the
interest is protected.97 A protected interest is created if state law restricts the
government's discretion in extending or terminating benefits.
98
When state law creates an entitlement to a benefit, the next issue is what
process is due. In Mathews v. Eldridge,99 the Court articulated the three
factors that must be considered in determining the sufficiency of the process
that is afforded:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. 0
When the nature of the benefit is such that its termination deprives the former
recipient of the "means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and
medical care," only a pre-termination hearing will suffice.'" Foster care is
unquestionably such a benefit.
Foster children have a protected interest in remaining in foster care past
their eighteenth birthday. The analysis of Plaintiffs' property right begins
with the statute that establishes the availability of foster care for youngsters
over eighteen years of age. Section 409.145(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes
provides:
The department is authorized to continue to provide the services of
the children's foster care program to individuals 18 to 21 years of
age who are enrolled in high school, in a program leading to a high
school equivalency diploma as defined in s. 229.814, or in a full-
(11 th Cir. 1989) (finding of protected interest supported by specific standards and procedures
to be applied when considering discharge or suspension).
97. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
98. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,271 (1970); Occean v. Keamey, 123 F. Supp. 2d
618, 623 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (right to remain in foster care past eighteenth birthday); Marisol A.
v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (wide variety of child welfare services);
Sockwell v. Mahoney, 431 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (D. Conn. 1976); Brian A. v. Sundquist, No.
3:00-0443,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18771 at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 26,2000).
99. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
100. Id. at 335.
101. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,264 (1970).
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time career education program, and to continue to provide services
of the children's foster care program to individuals 18 to 23 years
of age who are enrolled full-time in a postsecondary educational
institution granting a degree, a certificate, or an applied technology
diploma, if the following requirements are met:
1. The individual was committed to the legal custody of the de-
partment for placement in foster care as a dependent child;
2. All other resources have been thoroughly explored, and it can
be clearly established that there are no alternative sources for
placement; and
3. A written service agreement which specifies responsibilities and
expectations for all parties involved has been signed by a represen-
tative of the department, the individual, and the foster parent or li-
censed child-caring agency providing the placement resources.
10 2
Section 409.145(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[s]ervices shall
be terminated upon completion of or withdrawal or permanent expulsion
from high school" or other enumerated educational program.
10 3
Section 409.145(3) may give DCAF the discretion whether to create a
program of providing foster care services beyond a child's eighteenth birth-
day, but once the program is in place, DCAF's discretion is restricted con-
cerning which youngsters will be entitled to continue to receive the bene-
fits. 0 4 The program is limited to youngsters who attend one of the enumer-
ated educational or vocational programs, who were in foster care prior to
reaching eighteen years of age, and for whom no other placement resource
has been identified despite a thorough search. 10 5 DCAF cannot extend foster
care benefits to a youngster who does not meet these requirements and,
obversely, cannot deny the benefits to a child who meets the listed criteria.
102. FLA. STAT. § 409.145(3)(a) (2000).
103. § 409.145(3)(b).
104. See § 409.145(3).
105. A DCAF document that clearly is specifically intended for foster youth who have
turned eighteen years of age, states as follows:
You are 18! You made it! Now what? Many teens, staff and foster parents
have asked what happens to a teen in foster care when he or she turns 18.
You have several options: ... You may choose to remain in foster care to
complete your education. You may remain in a foster home, group place-
ment, or Supervised Practice Living through the Independent Living Program.
... To remain in foster care after 18, you must be attending a full time educa-
tional program. This could be high school, A G.E.D. Program, technical
school or college .... Once you are 18 if you do not attend school full-time,
you are no longer eligible to be in foster care.
Id. There are no other eligibility requirements cited in this document.
[Vol. 25:693
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/6
Gievers
"Once the Department begins to provide services [under section
409.145(3)(a)], its obligation is not voluntary. Subsection 409.145(3)(b)
mandates that the services continue so long as the individual complies with
the statutory requirements.
10 6
Section 409.145(3)(b) and this operating procedure recognize that an
individual can be involuntarily discharged from the program only for cause,
that is, noncompliance with the case plan or program. Under Memphis Light
and related cases, this fact establishes foster youth have a protected property
interest in remaining in foster care past their eighteenth birthday.1
0 7
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis and analogizing to the
welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, it is clear that a pre-termination
hearing before an impartial decision maker is essential to achieve due proc-
ess. The interest at risk for the youth being discharged is in having mini-
mally adequate food, shelter, and clothing. In the words of Goldberg, such
children will face "brutal need" upon discharge. Indeed, their need will be at
least as great as that faced by an adult welfare recipient who is not dis-
abled.10 8 Consequently, like welfare recipients, children must be allowed to
retain the benefit by remaining in foster care-pending review of DCAF's
discharge decision.
Disputes concerning whether the foster youth was, in fact, out of com-
pliance with the program or the case plan and, implicitly, whether the case
plan was appropriate to the young adult's individual needs, involve intensely
fact-sensitive issues which require an opportunity for an oral presentation
before an impartial fact finder in an environment that is suited to the foster
youth's abilities. Finally, the government has a very substantial interest in
retaining youth in foster care until they are able to live independently. Not
only will there be long term financial benefits from reduced welfare rolls and
these individuals' contributions to the state's economy, defendants, as these
youngsters' custodian, also have an interest in seeing former foster children
succeed in life.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[a] showing of irreparable harm is
'the sine qua non of injunctive relef." The Fourth Circuit decision in L.J.
v. Massinga"0 is illustrative of the test for irreparable injury in the foster care
setting. Foster children in the custody of the Baltimore City Department of
Social Services brought an action against state and city officials for their part
106. Melody v. Dep't of H.R.S., 696 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(Pariente, J., concurring).
107. Occean, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
108. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
109. N.E. Fla. Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (1lth Cir. 1990).
110. 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988).
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in administering Maryland's foster care program."' Plaintiffs alleged that as
a result of the Defendants' "maladministration of the program, they were
victims of physical and sexual abuse as well as medical neglect" and "sought
broad interim and permanent injunctive relief to redress the deficiencies in
the administration of the program and money damages."'"12 The district court
in Massinga found that there was a likelihood of irreparable harm to the
Plaintiffs if the interim relief was not granted." 3
The irreparable harm that foster youth face if terminated from foster
care without the opportunity to complete their education and develop neces-
sary job and independent living skills is borne out by the well-documented
outcomes of many youth discharged from foster care upon reaching age
eighteen. Because foster youth are not adequately prepared to survive on
their own at eighteen, the foster care system has created a whole new cate-
gory of homeless. Indeed, nationwide studies have shown that twenty to
forty percent of our country's homeless population consists of former foster
youth." 4 In fact, a 1991 National Association of Social Workers study found
that more than one fifth of teens at homeless shelters arrive directly from
foster care nationwide."15
In addition to comprising a large segment of our homeless population,
foster youth are disproportionately represented on public assistance rolls, in
state mental hospitals, and in state prisons." 6 These youth are more likely to
end up in prison or on welfare, and they often turn to drugs or prostitution." 7
111. /d.at 119.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 120.
114. See J.C. Barden, After Release From Foster Care, Many Turn to Lives on the
Streets, N.Y. TYIMEs, Jan. 6, 1991, at Al.
115. See Study by the Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers, A Summary of Findings from a
National Survey of Programs for Runaway and Homeless Youth and Programs for Older
Youth in Foster Care (1991) (on file with the Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers).
116. See Somini Sengupta, Youth Leaving Foster Care with Few Skills or Resources,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at Al; Barbara Vobejda, At 18, It's Sink or Swim; For Ex-Foster
Children, Transition is Difficult, WASH. POST, July 21, 1998, at Al; Sonia Nazario, Sex,
Drugs, and No Place to Go, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at Al; see also Diana J. English,
Sophia Kouidou-Giles & Martin Plocke, Readiness for Independence: A Study of Youth in
Foster Care, 16 Children and Youth Services Review, 147, 157 (1994) (indicating the skills
that youth lack by the time they emancipate from state foster care seriously impact their
successful transition to adulthood).
117. See U.S. House Rep. Nancy Johnson, Bill Before House Tomorrow, Congressional
Press Releases, June 24, 1999 (LEXIS, News Library, Press Release); The Foster-Care Trap,
N.Y. YORK POST, May 16, 1999, at 56; Michael Kelley, Not That Easy to be Free; Life Can
Sting at 18, on Your Own After Foster Care, The Commercial Appeal, May 4, 1999, at Cl;
Senator Kit Bond, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Finance Subcommittee of Health Care,
October 13, 1999 (LEXIS, News Library, Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony).
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Further, a recent study on former foster youth conducted by the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin found that "by 12-18 months past discharge, 37 percent of
the young adults had not yet completed high school, [and that only] nine
percent had entered college."' 8 Additionally, "one-quarter to one-third of
the youths reported a perceived lack of preparedness in several skill areas
[including managing money, living on own and parenting]." ' 19 Moreover, it
has been found that only fifty percent of post-foster care youths are em-
ployed twelve to eighteen months after leaving the foster care system.n2
It was because of findings such as these that Congress originally created
the federal Independent Living Initiative to ensure that all foster youth
sixteen years old and older would receive independent living services and
skills training in order to prevent these children from ending up homeless, on
welfare, or in jail.121
Most recently, in enacting the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999,
Congress found:
Congress has received extensive information that adolescents leav-
ing foster care have significant difficulty making a successful tran-
sition to adulthood; this information shows that children aging out
of foster care show high rates of homelessness, non-marital child-
bearing, poverty, and delinquent or criminal behavior; they are also
frequently the target of crime and physical assaults.
The Nation's State and local governments, with financial support
from the Federal Government, should offer an extensive program
of education, training, employment, and financial support for
young adults leaving foster care, with participation in such pro-
gram beginning several years before high school graduation and
118. Mark E. Courtney and Irving Piliavin, Foster Youth Transitions to Adulthood:
Outcomes 12 to 18 Months After Leaving Out-of-Home Care, at 2 (July 1998 (Revised Aug.
1998)).
119. See id.
120. See David Reyes, Something Lost in Transition for Foster Care Teens; Report
Cites Need for Young Adults Leaving System to Have Financial or Emotional Support to Help
Prevent Homelessness, Pregnancy and Joblessness, L.A. TImEs, Feb. 10, 2000, at BI; Scott
McCown, Foster Children Get a Fighting Chance, AusTN AM.-STAr MAN, Dec. 20, 1999, at
A17.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 677 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
20011
23
Gievers: Listening to Silenced Voices: Examining Potential Liability of St
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
continuing, as needed, until the young adults emancipated from
foster care establish independence or reach 21 years of age.
122
Society is best served by enabling youth who are committed to the
foster care system as dependent children and who have not completed their
education to remain in foster care after age eighteen in order to complete
their education and make a successful transition to adulthood. It is unques-
tionable that the public interest is best served by a well-run, humane, and
effectively administered foster care system, which will preserve the lives,
health, and safety of foster youth. Without such a system, the harm to the
public interest is substantial and tragic, with increased numbers of older
foster care children suffering neglect of the most damaging nature and the
costs to the youth, as well as the costs to our communities, continuing for a
lifetime.
Numerous studies conducted throughout the nation and numerous
legislative hearings leading up to the enactment of the Foster Care Independ-
ence Act of 1999 have come to the same conclusion, as has, most recently,
President Bush who stated:
The personal and emotional costs are especially high for young
people who leave foster care at age eighteen without having been
adopted. Research indicates that these young people experience
alarming rates of homelessness, early pregnancy, mental illness,
122. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, 106 Pub. L. No. 106-169, § 101, 113 Stat
1823 (1999). Through the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Congress doubled the
annual federal funding from $70 million to $140 million to enable states to serve foster youth
through the age of twenty-one. See id. The legislation provides for expanded training and
educational opportunities, access to health care, housing assistance, counseling and other
services for teenagers and young adults in foster care to help them make a successful transition
to adulthood. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 677 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). As noted by Rep.
Mark Foley (Fla.) in the House debate on this bill,
Last year Florida had 3,103 youths who were eligible for independent living
programs. Although some of these kids have foster parents who stick with
them and are willing to help, including giving them money out of their own
pockets, many have been shuffled around so much that they do not have any-
one to turn to.
These foster children have barely been able to be kids, and suddenly they are
forced to become instant adults. It is no wonder that many of them end up on
the streets or on welfare, or as teenaged parents.
145 CONG. Rnc. H4962 (daily ed. June 25, 1999) (statement of Sen. Foley) This new law has
had a significant impact on Florida's Independent Living budget for older foster youth, raising
it from $900,000 to $6.1 million. See Shana Gruskin, State to Help Foster Kids Master Adult
Life, SuN-SmTN,_L (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan 2, 2000, at lB.
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unemployment, and drug abuse in the first years after they leave
the system.123
Florida courts have held that Florida law does not permit the retention
of circuit court juvenile jurisdiction over a person after the age of eighteen
when she continues to receive services from the Department of Children and
Family Services.'2 Hence, if Leslie F. is improperly deprived of her right to
continued foster care benefits, she has no other means to seek any legal
remedy in the Florida state courts to make her whole.
B. Social Security Act
Agencies established under Title IV-D "must pursue enforcement" of
child support enforcement rights because families must "assign their support
rights to the state.'12 Just as the Supreme Court held in Wright that HUD
has "authority to audit, enforce annual contributions contracts, and cut off
federal funds [b]ut these generalized powers are insufficient to indicate a
congressional intention to foreclose [section] 1983 remedies,' 26 so too
should the Court hold that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act permits
private enforcement through section 1983.
Pursuant to the CSEA, state agencies must collect child support "in
order to reimburse the federal and state governments for the costs of main-
taining children in the federal IV-E foster care program., 127 Specifically, the
Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance
provides that, where appropriate, all steps will be taken, including
cooperative efforts with the State agencies administering the pro-
gram funded under part A and plan approved under part D, to se-
cure an assignment to the State of any rights to support on behalf
123. A Blueprint for New Beginnings: A Responsible Budget for America's Priorities,
EXEC. Doc. No. 041-001-00560-9, at 76 (2001) available at http:llwww.whitehouse.govl
news/usbudgetlblueprintlblueprint.pdf. To help this class of youth, President Bush has
proposed that the new federal budget "provide $60 million through the Foster Care Independ-
ence Program specifically for education and training vouchers to youth who 'age out' of foster
care." Id.
124. L.Y. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 696 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997); see also N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 770 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
125. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 10-11.
126. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
127. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 379.
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of each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under
this part. 21
Erickson describes policy concerns that arise under assignment and
children in foster care that do not arise under assignment and AFDC: the
assignment should be made only if it is appropriate and should be postponed
because of the propensity for economic instability of the former custodial
parent. 129 If the child returns home, then the support should be sent directly
to the custodial parent, provided that they are not welfare recipients.130 In
this instance, the issue of right of action of foster care children merges with
that of children who reside with their custodial parent.
V. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE STATE OF FLORIDA
A. In General
As was demonstrated previously, the Eleventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution protects the State of Florida and its representatives
from federal law based damage actions and protects the state itself [though
not representatives] from suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.",
The state's liability is different under state law, and the significance of the
differences varies depending on whether the suit is one sounding in tort or
contract. The analysis begins with Florida's Constitution, which reflects a
presumption of pre-existing state immunity from suit. It reads: "SECTION
13. Suits against the state. Provision may be made by general law for bring-
ing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originat-
ing.911
32
The 1973 Legislature officially passed a partial waiver of sovereign
immunity in tort cases, with various preconditions required and limitations
on damages recoverable. 33 In pertinent part, the current statute provides as
follows:
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the
state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives
128. 42 U.S.C. § 671(17) (1994).
129. ERICKSON, supra note 11, at 379-80 (citing Carol Golubuck, Cash Assistance to
Families: An Essential Component of Reasonable Efforts to Prevent and Eliminate Foster
Care Placement of Their Children, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1393, 1399 (April 1986)).
130. Id. at 381.
131. See also FLA. STAT. § 768.28(17) (2000).
132. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13.
133. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-313, § 1.
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sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent
specified in this act. Actions at law against the state or any of its
agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money
damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury
or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or
subdivision while acting within the scope of the employee's office
or employment under circumstances in which the state or such
agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this state, may be
prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act. Any such
action may be brought in the county where the property in litiga-
tion is located or, if the affected agency or subdivision has an of-
fice in such county for the transaction of its customary business,
where the cause of action accrued.'3
(5) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for
tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include
punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment. Nei-
ther the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay
a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of
$100,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which,
when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or
its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident or oc-
currence, exceeds the sum of $200,000. However, a judgment or
judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these
amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to
$100,000 or $200,000, as the case may be; and that portion of the
judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legis-
lature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of
the Legislature.... 135
(9)(a) No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its
subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a
party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as
134. § 768.28(1).
135. Id. § 768.28(5). For each separate incident of negligence that causes or contrib-
utes to damage, the statutory caps can be stacked. See, e.g., Pierce v. Town of Hastings, 509
So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her
or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or
agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or
property. The exclusive remedy for injury or damage suffered as a
result of an act, event, or omission of an officer, employee, or
agent of the state or any of its subdivisions or constitutional offi-
cers shall be by action against the governmental entity, or the head
of such entity in her or his official capacity, or the constitutional
officer of which the officer, employee, or agent is an employee,
unless such act or omission was committed in bad faith or with ma-
licious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disre-
gard of human rights, safety, or property. The state or its subdivi-
sions shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an offi-
cer, employee, or agent committed while acting outside the course
and scope of her or his employment or committed in bad faith or
with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and will-
ful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.
36
B. Liability in Tort Cases
The sovereign immunity waiver statute applies to all government enti-
ties, although municipalities were historically treated differently and could be
held liable where a special duty to the injured person existed, even though
another government entity may have been immune. 137 The 1973 adoption of
the statute has effectively eliminated the different treatment of municipali-
ties. 138 The Florida waiver statute essentially imposes liability on govern-
ment entities when their negligent conduct is the type of conduct which
would result in a private citizen being liable for damages caused by the same
type of negligent conduct. 139 In analyzing the types of conduct for which
waiver of immunity exists and those governmental non-private types of acts
for which immunity continues without waiver, the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the following four-part test:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily in-
volve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective?
136. § 768.28(9)(a).
137. Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
138. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
139. § 768.28(1).
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(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the re-
alization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objec-
tive as opposed to one which would not change the course or
direction of the policy, program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of ba-
sic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of
the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or
make the challenged act, omission, or decision? 140
As a further litmus test, the court also adopted the analysis of Johnson v.
State1'4 to differentiate between planning and operational levels of decision
making, with the waiver of tort immunity applying solely to nongovern-
mental, discretionary, operational level negligence.142
It is important to note that the statute can also have an effect on the
liability of government employees and agents in their representative and
individual capacities. The statute precludes personal liability suits against
individuals in their individual capacity for any act "within the scope" of their
employment or agency "unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad
faith'or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
disregard of human rights, safety, or property.143
Thus, individual liability remains for acts "not within the scope" and for
egregious acts meeting the bad faith, malicious purpose, or willful disregard
threshold.'" A clerk of court officer whose duties expressly include the
proper indexing of documents relating to real property can be sued in tort for
damages caused by negligence in recording a title document; no immunity
precluded the suit or the liability. 45 There can clearly be individual govern-
ment employee liability for acts outside the scope of employment;" 46 the
140. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1019 (citing Evangelical United Brethen
Church v. State, 407 P.2d 440,445 (1965)).
141. 447 P.2d 352, 360 (1968).
142. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1022.
143. § 768.28(9)(a).
144. Id. By statute, for non-egregious, covered acts "within the scope" the only proper
defendant is the government entity itself. See id.
145. First American Title Ins. v. Dixon, 603 So. 2d 562, 566 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
146. § 768.28(9); O.A.G. 80-57 (1980); see White v. Crandon, 156 So. 303 (1934)
(member of county commission board will be held personally liable for money voted and paid
out without authority of law where the payment is equivalent to misappropriation of public
funds).
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determination of whether a particular wrongful act is within the scope of
employment or not is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact. 147
As one contemplates potential theories of action against a state a ency,
it should be noted that the immunity stated relates to "liabilities," 1§8 and
actions against a government body for injunctive or other equitable relief are
not necessarily precluded by sovereign immunity under state or federal
law.' 49
Although the legislature has not enacted any law waiving sovereign
immunity in contract actions, Florida's courts recognize the inequity that
would be present if the state could violate its contractual obligations with
impunity, and have allowed actions to go forward against the state. In Pan-
Am Tobacco v. Department of Corrections,15° the Supreme Court of Florida
unequivocally held, in answering a question certified by the district court to
be of the utmost importance, that sovereign immunity cannot be properly
raised by government as a defense to an action for breach of an express,
written contract.' 5 ' In so doing, the court relied upon the general powers of
state agencies to enter into contracts and reasoned that because such contracts
would be valid only if mutually enforceable the legislature obviously in-
tended for state agencies to be amenable to suits for breaches of said express
contracts. 52 In Champagne-Webber v. Fort Lauderdale,153 the court held
that an action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith inherent in the
express contract would also lie.' 54 Similarly, governmental liability for
prejudgment interest has been allowed, despite an absence of any statute
expressly waiving immunity for same. 55 A cause of action may also be
147. Alvarez v. Cotarelo, 626 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
148. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13.
149. E.g., Seminole Co. v. Mertz, 415 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(injunction requiring county to prevent the flow of surface water onto lower-lying property;
sovereign immunity not applicable); Mallo, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (injunction requiring
reimbursement of excess funds demanded and received by county).
150. 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
151. Id. at 5.
152. Id.
153. 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
154. Id. at 698. In Champagne-Webber, the contractor relied on the city's representa-
tion that the soil on which construction would occur was all sand, and made its bid according-
ly. Id. at 696-97. The rock discovered under the sand during construction increased the work
to be done and the cost. Id. at 697. The Champagne-Webber court's rationale was expressly
approved by the Supreme Court of Florida. County of Brevard v. Miorelli Engineering, Inc.,
703 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 1997).
155. See generally Broward County v. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990) (from
date of demand); Florida Livestock Bd v. Gladdens, 86 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1956); Public Health
Trust of Dade v. State, 629 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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stated against an individual employee personally in an action for breach of a
contractual duty of a gratuitous bailee. 
R 6
VI. APPLICATION OF FLORIDA LAW TO CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT VIOLATIONS
There are two situations in which it is likely that liability for violating
the child support enforcement laws will easily be found. First, when the
noncustodial parent is known, but no action is taken to obtain a support
order, the state violates its nondiscretionary ministerial obligation under
federal and Florida law. Suite would therefore be proper to compel the
official to obtain the support order.
If the child is in foster care in the state's custody as a dependent child
pursuant to section 39 of the Florida Statutes, there is an absolute duty to
provide all basic services up to age twenty-one under federal law' 57 and the
extended assistance provided under state law up to age twenty-three for
foster youth who continue to pursue their educations.'58 An action for
injunctive relief on behalf of an in-school foster youth would be appropriate
here as well, to compel the state to comply with its nondiscretionary duties.
In the case of non-foster children for whom the state receives money,
but fails to distribute funds to the custodial parent for the benefit of the child,
available remedies under the authorities cited above would appear to include
actions for damages under tort or contract law against the state itself or the
official whose nonfeasance or misfeasance delayed or prevented the distribu-
tion, as well as equitable remedies such as a suit for mandamus or other
injunctive relief.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under federal and Florida law, legal action is appropriate to enforce the
state's obligations to collect and distribute for the direct benefit of children
the child support which the noncustodial parent has been ordered to pay.
Such a suit can be brought against the agency head responsible for enforce-
ment of the obligations pertaining to a non-foster child, and against the
responsible official of the Department of Children and Families in the case of
foster children.
156. See generally Palm Court Corp. v. Smith, 137 So. 234 (1931).
157. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, supra note 122.
158. See generally id.
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